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Abstract
This article compares the effects of various fiscal policies on choices of
development timing and capital intensity when rents on housing follow geometric
Brownian motion with those when rents follow arithmetic Brownian motion. These
policy instruments include fees on capital, housing, and land, and taxes on urban
income, and properties both before and after development. Regardless of the motion
of rents, when one choice is fixed, the effects of these policy instruments on the other
choice are qualitatively the same. When the two choices are determined endogenously,
although these policy instruments exhibit the same qualitative effect on the choice of
development timing, they may exhibit different effects on the choice of capital intensity
if rents on housing follow different types of motions.
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I. Introduction
One central topic on urban economics is how fiscal policies affect choices of the
timing and capital intensity of development.
1 In their seminal article, Arnott and
Lewis (1979) abstract from the spatial factor and investigate how taxation before and
after development affects these two choices in a deterministic environment. Turnbull
(1988a; 1988b) investigates the same issue by incorporating the spatial factor into the
Arnott-Lewis model. McFarlane (1999) extends Turnbull’ s model by providing a
through analysis of the effects of various fees and taxes on these two choices.
2 All of
the above articles have shed some insights, yet they abstract from the issue of
uncertainty, which is thought to be a main characteristic of real estate markets.
The literature on real options typically assumes that the source of uncertainty
comes from rents on housing. To capture the uncertainty, two types of motions are
commonly employed: geometric Brownian motion (henceforth GBM) and aritmetric
Brownian motion (henceforth ABM). As discussed in Capozza and Li (1994, p. 893),
the empirical data shows that rents on housing look more like a normal distribution than
a log-normal distribution, and thus they assume that these rents follow ABM. In
addition to Capozza and Li (1994), the literature which assumes that rents on housing
follow ABM include Capozza and Hesley (1990), and Capozza and Sick (1994).
However, the shortcoming of this assumption is that rents can be negative.
Consequently, it is more commonly for the real options literature (see, e.g., Bar-Ilan and
Strange, 1996; Grenadier, 2000; Williams, 1991) to assume that rents on housing follow
1 Several earlier articles abstract from the choice of capital intensity. For example, Skouras (1978)
provides an early analysis indicating that property taxation is non-neutral in its effect on land
development timing. Mills (1983) introduces property taxation in a model of competitive equilibrium
and investigates the timing effects of taxation on land development. Brueckner (1986) investigates how
a shift to a graded tax system (where the improvements tax rate is lowered and the land tax rate is raised)
affects the level of improvements, the value of land and the price of housing in the long-run. Finally,
Anderson (1986) focuses on how property taxation affects the timing decision of land development.
2 See also a thorough review byAnderson (2005).3
GBM, which restricts rents to be positive. The purpose of this article is to investigate
how the existence of uncertainty and how different types of uncertainty affect the
results regarding the impacts of fiscal policies on choices of the timing and capital
intensity of development.
The fiscal policies which we consider include three types of fees and three types of
taxes: fees on capital, housing and land, and taxation on urban income and properties
both before and after development. We find that, when the development timing is
fixed, the effects of these policy instruments on the choice of capital intensity are
qualitatively the same regardless of the type of evolution of rents on housing. When
the capital intensity is fixed, the effects of these policy instruments on the choice of
development timing are also qualitatively the same regardless of the type of evolution
of rents on housing. When both choices are determined endogenously, although the
effects of these policy instruments exhibit the same qualitative effect on the
development timing, yet they may exhibit different effects on the choice of capital
intensity for different types of evolution of rents on housing.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section II presents the
basic model. Section III solves choices regarding the timing and capital intensity of
development when rents on housing follow GBM and ABM, respectively. Section IV
investigates how various forms of fees and taxes on developed properties affect these
two choices. Section V concludes and offers extension for future research.
II. The Model
Suppose that at date 0 t  a landowner has undeveloped land that is normalized
at one unit. At any time, i.e., 0 t  , the landowner is able to develop property. We
assume that the rent on one unit of housing is given by4
( ( ), ) ( ) , D R x t D x t e  (1)
where ) (t x denotes the macroeconomic shock from the demand side, and D is the
distance from the CBD, which is the only characteristic that distinguishes parcels of
land in a city that is monocentric. Equation (1) indicates that the rent on one unit of
housing is decreasing convex in the distance from the CBD (i.e.
2 2 / 0, / 0 R D R D       ). This differs from the real options literature such as
Capozza and Helsley (1990), Capozza and Li (1994), and Capozza and Sick (1994),
where the rent on one unit of housing is assumed to decline linearly from the distance
to the CBD, i.e., / 0 R D    and
2 2 / 0 R D    .
We assume that housing, Q, is produced with capital, K and land L. The
production function is of a Cobb-Douglas type given by 1 ( , ) Q K L K L     , where
0 1    . Define / g Q L  , and / k K L  , thus the production function for the
owner of one unit of vacant land is given by
( ) g k k  . (2)
We assume that the cost of capital per unit of land is equal to a positive constant,
denoted by c. We consider three forms of fees and three kinds of taxes. The former
include the fee rate on capital, K f , the fee rate on housing, Q f , and the fee rate on
land, L f . As a result, the total costs per unit of land are given by
( ) ( ) k Q L C k c f k f k f      . (3)
The tax instruments include the tax rate on urban income, r , the tax rate on property
before development, b , and the tax rate on property after development, a . As a
result, the after-tax rent per unit of developed property is the product of5
(1 ) ( )
D
r x t e
   and k
 , thus yielding
( ( ), ) (1 ) ( )
D
a r R x t D x t e k
     . (4)
We assume that landowners are risk neutral and face a risk-less rate of interest,
denoted by  , which is constant per unit of time. We also assume that undeveloped
properties do not have any return, and thus landowners have no option value to abandon
them. We also abstract from both the time-to-build problem that usually occurs in the
real estate industry (see, e.g., Bar-Ilan and Strange, 1996; Grenadier, 2000), and the
redevelopment problem addressed in Williams (1997). Consequently, in what follows,
each landowner will make his development decision once and for all. Our simplified
assumptions may be not so realistic, yet they help us gain insights regarding the impacts
of optimal property taxation.
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III. Choices of the Date and Density of Development
Without risk of confusions, we denote ( ) x t as x in what follows. Consider
any t T  . Given that redevelopment is prohibited, the value of one unit of land after
development is equal to the (time t) expected present value of the future cash flow
given by
( ) ( , , ) [(1 ) ( ) ( ( ), , )] .
D s t
a t r a a t W x D k E x s e k W x s D k e ds
            (5)
Equation (5) can be rewritten as
( )( ) ( , , ) (1 ) ( ) a s t D
a t r t W x D k E x s e k e ds
           . (6)
3 We also assume that all lots are simultaneously developed and are finished instantly. These
assumptions are usually adopted in the real options literature (see, e.g., Capozza and Li, 1994; Childs,
Riddiough and Triantis, 1996; Williams, 1991). We thus neither allow lots to be developed sequentially
nor allow the development of real estate to take the form of a sequential investment (see, e.g., Bar-Ilan
and Strange, 1998).6
Define ( , , , ) b W x T D k as the value of one unit of vacant land, which is given by
( ) ( , , , ) { ( ( ( ), , , )
T s t
b t b b t W x T D k E W x s T D k e ds
       (7)
( ) ( ) ((1 ) ( ) ( ( ), , )) [( ) ] }
D s t T t
r a a K Q L T x s e k W x s D k e ds c f k f k f e
                   
Equation (7) indicates that the expected present value of returns to one unit of vacant
land is the sum of the negative expected present value of taxation on vacant land until
time T and the after-tax expected present value of land rent beginning at the time of
development, less the expected present value of the developing costs. Following
Anderson (1993), Capozza and Li (1994), and McFarlane (1999), a more tractable
expression for the value of one unit of vacant land is given by
( )( ) ( )( ) ( , , , ) { [ (1 ) ( )
(( ) )]}.
b a T t s T D
b t r T
K Q L
W x T D k E e x s e k e ds
c f k f k f
          

  
   
 (8)
A landowner needs to choose an appropriate timing T and capital intensity k to
maximize the value of one unit of vacant land. This is defined as
,
( ) max ( , , , ) b
T k
Z x W x T D k  . In the following, we respectively assume that rents on one
unit of housing follow GBM and ABM.
A. Geometric Brownian Motion








     (9)
where the growth rate of ( ) x t has a constant expected growth rate  and a constant
variance of the growth rate 2 , and ( ) d t  is an increment to a standard Wiezer
process. The value of one unit of land after development given by equation (6) is thus7
equal to
(1 )
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   
(11)
where 1 A and 2 A are constants to be determined, and 1  and 2  are
respectively given by
2
1 2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2
2( ) 1 1
( ) 1,
2 2
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(12)
A landowner simultaneously chooses the timing and capital intensity in the
presence of uncertainty. As indicated by Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p.139), when
uncertainty arises, we are unable to determine a non-stochastic timing. Instead, the
development rule takes the form where the landowner will not develop vacant land
until x rises to a level, denoted by * x . When this trigger level is reached, the
landowner will develop vacant land at the capital intensity, denoted by * k . Both * x
and
* k , together with 1 A and 2 A in equation (11), are solved from the equations
given by:
0
lim ( ) [( ) ], K Q L
x
Z x c f k f k f


     (13)









* * * * { ( , , ) [( ) ]}
0.
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Equation (13) is the boundary condition which states that the value of the option to
develop one unit of vacant land, the first two terms on the right-hand side of equation
(11), is worthless as the factor that shifts the rent on one unit of housing approaches its
minimum permissible value of zero. Equation (14) is the value-matching condition
which states that, at the optimal timing of development, a landowner should be
indifferent as to whether vacant land is developed or not. Equation (15) is the
smooth-pasting condition, which requires that the landowner not obtain any arbitrage
profits from deviating from the optimal timing of development. Equation (16)
indicates that the chosen capital intensity should maximize the net value of developing
one unit of vacant land immediately, which in turn, requires that the marginal value of
capital be equal to the marginal cost of capital.
T o   s o l v e   a   l a n d o w n e r ’ s   c h o i c e   o f   t i m i n g ,   w e can solve 1 A and 2 A from
equations (13) and (15), respectively. Substituting these values into equation (14), and
referring to its result as * * ( , ) g M x k yields
* *
* * * *
1
(1 ) 1




g K Q L
a
e k x
M x k c f k f k f

   
       
    
(17)
where the notation ( ) g M  represents the condition for the choice of development
timing when the rent on one unit of housing follows GBM. Referring to the result of
equation (16) as * * ( , ) g S x k yields
1
1 * *
* * * (1 )







S x k c f f k
 
     
     
   
(18)9
where the notation () g S  represents the condition for the choice of capital intensity
when the rent on one unit housing follows GBM.
B.Arithmetic Brownian Motion
Suppose that the factor that shifts the rent on one unit of housing follows ABM
given by
( ) ( ), 0, x t dt d t      (19)
where ( ) x t has a constant expected growth rate  and a constant variance of the
growth rate 2 , and ( ) d t  is an increment to a standard Wiener process. The value
of one unit of land after development given by equation (6) is thus equal to
2
(1 ) (1 )
( , , ) .





xe k xe k
W x D k
       
 
     
(20)
Using equation (19) and ap p l y i n g   I t ô ’ s   l e m m a yields (seeAppendix B)
1 2
1 2 2
(1 ) (1 )
( ) ,
( ) ( )
D D
x x r r
a a
xe k xe k
Z x B e B e
   
     
   
     
(21)
where 1 B and 2 B are constants to be determined, and 1  and 2  are defined in
equation (12). The counterparts of equations (17) and (18), which respectively show
the conditions for choices of development timing and capital intensity when the rent on
one unit of housing followsABM, are respectively, given by
* *
* * * * *
2
1
(1 ) (1 ) 1
( , ) ( ) ( ) 0,
( ) ( )
D D
r r
a K Q L
a a
e k e k
M x k x c f k f k f
 
       
       
      
(22)10
1 1
1 * * *
* * *
2
(1 ) (1 )
( , ) ( ) 0.





e k x e k
S x k c f f k
   
          
      
     
(23)
We have not obtained analytically tractable solutions for both the choice of date of
development,
* x , and that of capital density,
* k for both cases in which rents on
housing follow GBM and ABM, respectively. To gain insights regarding how the
underlying exogenous forces affect
* x and
* k , we must focus on both the condition
for deriving
* x given by equation (17), and that for deriving
* k given by equation
(18) for the case where rents on housing to follow GBM. Equation (17) implicitly
defines the positive dependence of
* x on
* k , and equation (18) implicitly defines the
positive dependence of * k on * x . We derive these two relationships in equations
(C1)-(C7) in Appendix C. Similar arguments can be applied to equations (22) and (23)
for the case where rents on housing follow ABM. We derive their relationships in
equations (D1)-(D7) in Appendix D.
IV. Comparative Statics
Propositions 1 and 2 hold regardless of whether the rent on one unit of housing
follows GBM orABM.
Proposition 1: Suppose that the capital intensity is given. A landowner will wait for a
better state to develop (
* x is increased) if (i) the landowner’ s parcel of land is located
farther from the CBD (D is increased), or the landowner pays more taxes on either
urban rental income ( r  is increased), or property after development ( a  is increased);
(ii) the landowner pays more fees on capital ( K f is increased), on housing ( Q f is
increased) or on land ( L f is increased); (iii) the landowner pays less tax on property
before development ( b  is decreased).11
Proof: SeeAppendix E.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. Consider the premises stated in
Proposition 1(i), i.e., an increase in either the distance from the CBD, the tax rate on
urban rental income, or the tax rate on property after development. The value of one
unit of developed property, given by either equation (10) for the case of GBM or
equation (20) for the case of ABM, will then be reduced. Given the premises stated in
Proposition 1(ii), i.e., an increase in the fee on either capital, housing, or land, the costs
of development given by equation (3) will be increased. All of these decrease the net
value of developing one unit of vacant land immediately. To compensate this loss, a
landowner will thus wait for a better state to develop vacant land. By contrast, given
the premise stated in Proposition 1(iii), i.e., a fall in the tax rate before development,
the after-tax value of property before development will be raised. The opportunity
cost for a landowner to develop vacant land will thus be increased, forcing the owner to
develop vacant land at a better state. The results of Proposition 1 is also shown by an
upward shift from line MM to line ' ' M M as shown by Figures 1-4.
Proposition 2: Suppose that the timing of development is given. A landowner will
employ capital less intensively ( * k is decreased) if (i) the landowner’ s parcel of land is
located farther from the CBD, or the landowner pays more taxes on either urban rental
income or property after development; (ii) the landowner pays more fees on either
capital or housing; (iii) The landowner’ s choice of capital intensity is independent on
either the fee rate on land or the tax on property before development.
Proof: SeeAppendix F.
The intuition behind Propositions 2 is as follows. Given the premises stated in12
Proposition 2(i), i.e., an increase in either the distance from the CBD, the tax rate on
urban rental income, or the tax rate on property after development, the marginal benefit
of capital will be reduced. Given the premises stated in Proposition 2(ii), i.e., an
increase in the fee rate on either capital or housing, the marginal cost of capital will be
raised. All of these induce a landowner to employ less capital. Propositions 2(i) and
2(ii) are also shown by an leftward shift from line SS to line ' ' S S as shown by
Figures 2-4. By contrast, a change in either the fee rate on land or the tax rate on
property before development will affect neither the marginal benefit nor the marginal
cost of capital, and is thus unrelated to the choice of capital intensity. This explains
the reason for Proposition 2(iii).
Propositions 3 and 4 stated below (see also Table 1) indicate how changes in
various forms of fees and taxes  a f f e c t   a   l a n d o w n e r ’ s   c h o i c e s   o f   development timing
and capital intensity when these two choices are jointly determined. They
respectively examine the cases where rents on housing follow GBM andABM.
Proposition 3: Suppose that the rent on one unit of housing follows GBM. (i) A
landowner will wait for a better state to develop, while employing more capital if he
pays more fees on land or less tax on property before development. (ii) A landowner
will wait for a better state to develop, while leaving his choice of capital intensity
unchanged if the landowner either owns a parcel of land that is located farther from the
CBD, or pays more taxes on urban rental income or on property after development.
(iii) A landowner will wait for a better state to develop vacant land, while employing
more capital if he pays more fees on housing. (iv) A landowner will wait for a better to
develop, while employing less capital if he pays more fees on capital. (v) When
properties before and after development are taxed at the same rate, an increase in this
rate will reduce the choice of capital intensity, while exhibiting an indeterminate effect13
on the choice of development timing.
Proof: SeeAppendix G.
We explain the intuition behind Propositions 3(i) by using Figure 1. Let us
consider a rise in the fee rate on land or a fall in the tax rate on property before
development. Suppose that the initial equilibrium may be represented by point A, the
intersection of lines SS and MM , where a landowner develops vacant land at the
date
*
1 x and at the capital intensity
*
1 k . As indicated by Propositions 1(ii) and 1(iii),
respectively, when the capital intensity is fixed, the landowner will develop later (as
shown by the line MM that shifts upward to line ' ' M M ). We call this the “ direct”
effect on the choice development timing. This, in turn, will induce the landowner to
employ more capital to develop vacant land, as indicated by equation (C4). We call
this the “ indirect” effect on the choice of capital intensity. The equilibrium point thus
moves from point A along line SS to point B, the intersection of the lines SS and
' ' M M . As compared to the initial equilibrium point A, at point B, the landowner
develops vacant land at a later date *
2 x (> *




For the other cases, we must also take the following effects into account: As
shown by Proposition 2, when the timing of development is fixed, given the premises
stated in Propositions 3(ii)-(iv), a landowner perceives that the net marginal benefit
from developing land will be reduced such that the landowner will employ less capital.
We call this the “ direct” effect on the choice of capital intensity. This is shown by the
line SS that shifts leftward to the line ' ' S S in Figures 2-4. This, in turn, will
induce the landowner to develop earlier because waiting will then be less valuable
when he develops less intensively, as indicated in equation (C1). We call this the14
“ indirect”effect on the choice of development timing. The equilibrium point thus
moves from point B along line ' ' S S to point C in these figures. Summing these two
effects may give rise to ambiguous results with regard to the choices of development
timing and capital intensity. For all the cases stated in Propositions 3(ii)-(iv), a
landowner will delay developing vacant land because the direct (delaying) effect more
than offsets the indirect (hastening) effect. Nevertheless, the impacts of the factors
stated in Propositions 3(ii)-(iv) on capital intensity can be different. As shown by
Figure 2, the landowner will choose the same capital intensity when the distance from
the CBD is lengthened, and the tax rate on either urban income or property after
development is increased because the indirect (more capital intensive) effect exactly
offsets the direct effect. Consequently, the landowner will choose the same capital
intensity as compared to the initial equilibrium point A. Furthermore, as shown by
Figure 3, the landowner will employ more capital when the fee rate on housing is
increased because the indirect effect more than offsets the direct effect. By contrast,
as shown by Figure 4, the landowner will employ less capital when the fee rate on
capital is increased because the indirect effect less than offsets the direct effect.
Table 1 also shows the results of Proposition 3(v). It is clear that if properties
after and before development are taxed at the same rate, i.e., a b  , an increase in
this rate will affect the choice of development timing, * x ambiguously as an increase
in a  raises
* x , while an increase in b  reduces
* x . An increase in this rate will
reduce the choice of capital intensity,
* k , as an increase in a  does not affect
* k ,
while an increase in b  reduces
* k . We thus explain the reasoning for Proposition
3(iv).
Proposition 4: Suppose that the rent on one unit of housing follows ABM. (i) A15
landowner will wait for a better state to develop, while employing more capital if he
pays either more fees on land or less tax on property before development. (ii) A
landowner will wait for a better state to develop, while leaving his choice of capital
intensity unchanged if he pays more fees on housing. (iii) A landowner will wait for a
better state to develop, while employing less capital if he either owns a parcel of land
that is located farther from the CBD, pays more fees on capital, or pays more taxes on
urban rental income and property after development. (iv) When properties before and
after development are taxed at the same rate, an increase in this rate will reduce the
choice of capital intensity, while exhibiting an indeterminate effect on the choice of
development timing.
Proof: SeeAppendix H.
The reason for Proposition 4(i) is exactly the same as that for Proposition 3(i).
Consider the premises stated in Proposition 4(i), i.e., a rise in the fee rate on land or a
fall in the tax rate on property before development. Both of which do not exhibit
direct impacts on the choice of capital intensity and will thus exhibit the same
qualitative indirect effect on the choice of development timing and capital intensity as
for the case where rents on housing follow GBM. This is also shown by Figure 1.
For factors other than these two instruments, both lines that characterize choices of the
development timing and capital intensity, i.e., lines MM and SS , respectively in
Figures 2-4, will shift when these factors are changed. We can compare how these
two lines shift when the rent on one unit housing follows ABM with those when it
follows GBM. When x(t) follows ABM, it will be normally distributed. As a result,
the negative impacts of these factors on the choice of capital intensity will be greater16
as compared to the case where x(t) follows GBM, which implies a log-normal
distribution of ( ) x t that is skew to the right. Consequently, a rise in the fee rate on
housing, which raises the choice of capital intensity when x(t) follows GBM as shown
by Figure 3, will instead leave the choice of capital intensity unchanged when x(t)
followsABM, as shown by Figure 2. This explains the reason for Proposition 4(ii).
The reason for Proposition 4(iii) is as follows: a rise in either the distance from the
CBD or the tax rate on either urban income or property after development does not
exhibit any impact on the choice of capital intensity when x(t) follows GBM, as shown
by Figure 2. However, it will reduce the choice of capital intensity when x(t) follows
ABM, as shown by Figure 4. A rise in the fee rate on capital already reduces the
choice of capital intensity when x(t) follows GBM, and thus also exhibits the same
qualitative effect when x(t) followsABM. This is also shown in Figure 4.
Table 1 also shows the results of Proposition 4(iv). It is clear that if properties
after and before development are taxed at the same, i.e., a b  , an increase in this
rate will affect the choice of development timing, * x , ambiguously as an increase in
a  raises * x , while an increase in b  reduces * x . An increase in this rate will
reduce the choice of capital intensity, * k , as increases in both a  and b  reduce * k .
We thus explain the reason for Proposition 4(iv).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insert Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 here
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
McFarlane (1999) is closely related to our article, but departs from ours as follows.
First, McFarlane does not impose any functional form on the rent on housing. His
result thus hinges on a ratio which captures the growth rate of the rent on housing.17
Second, McFarlane assumes that the rent on housing is increasing over time, thus
precluding the possibility of negative rents on housing as captured by the ABM of ( ) x t .
Table 1 indicates that we yield the same qualitative results regarding the impacts on
choices of development timing and capital intensity as McFarlane’ s for two policy
instruments, i.e., the fee rate on land and the tax rate on land before development.
We yield the same qualitative result regarding the impact on the choice of development
timing as McFarlane’ s for two exogenous variables, i.e., the distance from the CBD and
the fee rate on housing. Finally, we yield different qualitative results regarding the
impact on the timing of development for two policy instruments, i.e., the fee rate on
capital and the tax rate on urban income; We find that the imposing of these two
instruments delays development, while McFarlane finds that it exhibits no effect on the
timing of development.
We can also compare our results with those of Arnott and Lewis (1979) and
Capozza and Li (1994) regarding how taxation on property before and after
development affects choices of development timing and capital intensity. Given that
the rent on housing follows GBM, our results are qualitative the same as those of Arnott
and Lewis (1979). Our model can be viewed as an extension of their model as they
abstract from the spatial factor and assume that the rent on housing is increasing over
time at a constant rate. We find that their results continue to hold even when we relax
their assumptions. Finally, given that the rent on housing follows ABM, we get the
same qualitative result as Capozza and Li’ s as our assumptions are exactly the same as
theirs.
V. Conclusion
This article compares the effects of various fiscal policies on choices of18
development timing and capital intensity when rents on housing follow geometric
Brownian motion with those when rents follow arithmetic Brownian motion. These
policy instruments include fees on capital, housing, and land, and taxes on urban
income, and properties both before and after development. Regardless of the motion
of rents, when one choice is fixed, the effects of these policy instruments on the other
choice are qualitatively the same. When the two choices are determined endogenously,
although these policy instruments exhibit the same qualitative effect on the choice of
development timing, they may exhibit different effects on the choice of capital intensity
if rents on housing follow different types of motions.
Our article can be extended as follows. In a recent article, Arnott (2005)
investigates the issue regarding how to choose a set of policy instruments, which
include time-invariant tax rates on predevelopment land value, post development
residual site value, and structure value such that the three objectives are achieved:
neutrality with respect to development timing and density, and expropriation of a
desired fraction of value. Within our framework, we can also investigate how these
sets of policy investments are affected by the existence of uncertainty, and by different
assumptions regarding the types of uncertainty.19
AppendixA:
Consider the problem of choosing the appropriate time of development and capital
intensity such that equation (8) is maximized. Given that ( ) x t follows GBM as
shown by equation (9), the Bellman-Hamilton-Jacobi value function for this problem
can be written as
,
( ) ( )
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Treating () Z as an asset value, using equation (9), and applying I t ô ’ s   l e m m a yields its
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Equation (A3) indicates that the expected capital gain of the asset plus the cash flow,
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the flow-equivalent rents
from developing vacant land minus the flow equivalent costs of development, should be
equal to the normal return ( ) () b Z     to prevent any arbitrage profits from arising.
The term x
 solves the homogeneous part of the equation (A3). Substituting this
into equation (A3) yields the quadratic equation given by
2




          (A4)
Define 1  and 2  as the larger and smaller roots of equation (A4). One particular
solution from the non-homogeneous part of equation (A3) is:20
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The general solution of equation (A3), which is composed of solutions from both the
homogeneous and non-homogeneous parts of equation (A3), is shown in equation (11).
Appendix B:
Consider the problem of choosing the appropriate time and density of development
such that equation (8) is maximized. Given that ( ) x t follows ABM as shown by
equation (19), the Bellman-Hamilton-Jacobi value function for this problem can be
written as
2 ,
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Treating ( ) Z  as an asset value, using equation (19), and applyin g   I t ô ’ s   l e m m a   y i e l d s  
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Equation (B3) indicates that the expected capital gain of the asset plus the cash flow,
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should be equal to the normal return ( ) () b Z     to prevent any arbitrage profits from
arising. The term x
 solves the homogeneous part of the equation (B3).
Substituting this into equation (B3) also yields the quadratic equation given by equation
(A4). One particular solution from the non-homogeneous part of equation (B3) is:
2
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( ) [( ) ].
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(B4)
The general solution of equation (B3), which is composed of solutions from both the
homogeneous and non-homogeneous parts of equation (B3), is shown in equation (21).
Appendix C:
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Totally differentiating equation (18) with respect to
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The Jacobian condition also requires that
11 22 12 21 0.       (C7)
We depict the impact of
* k on
* x in equation (C1), and that of
* x on
* k in
equation (C4) by line MM and line SS in Figures 1-4, respectively. Equation (C7)
requires that the slope of SS be steeper than that of MM , and we find that this
requirement is satisfied.
This completes the proof.
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Totally differentiating equation (23) with respect to
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The Jacobian condition also requires that
11 22 12 21 0.           (D7)
We depict the impact of * k on * x in equation (D1), and that of * x on * k in
equation (D4) by line MM and line SS in Figures 1-4, respectively. Equation (D7)
requires that the slope of line SS be steeper than that of line MM in Figure 1, and
we find that this condition is satisfied.
This completes the proof.
Appendix E:
Differentiating * * ( , ) g M x k in equation (17) with respect to D, K f , Q f , L f ,
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since 1/ 0 b d d   .25
Differentiating * * ( , ) a M x k in equation (23) with respect to D, K f , Q f , L f ,
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.
This completes the proof.
Appendix F:
Differentiating * * * ( , ) g S x k in equation (18) with respect to D, K f , Q f , L f ,
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Differentiating * * * ( , ) a S x k in equation (24) with respect to D, K f , Q f , L f ,
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This completes the proof.
Appendix G:













respect to D, K f , Q f , L f , r , a , and b  yields
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This completes the proof.
Appendix H:
Totally differentiating * x and * k with respect to D , K f , Q f , L f , r , a ,
and b  yields
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This completes the proof.33
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Figure 1: Arise in L f or a fall in b  when the rent follows GBM orABM.
Figure 2: Arise in D, r , or a  when the rent follows GBM,












































Figure 3: Arise in Q f when the rent follows GBM
Figure 4: Arise in K f when the rent follows GBM









































Table 1: Comparative Statics Results
* k fixed * x fixed ( ) x t follows GBM ( ) x t followsABM McFarlane (1999)
* x * k * x * k * x * k * x * k
D >0 <0 >0 =0 >0 <0 >0 0


K f >0 <0 >0 <0 >0 <0 =0 0


Q f >0 <0 >0 >0 >0 =0 >0 0


L f >0 =0 >0 >0 >0 >0 >0 >0
r  >0 <0 >0 =0 >0 <0 =0 0








b  <0 =0 <0 <0 <0 <0 <0 <0
a b   0


<0 0


<0 0


0

